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**Taking back control: Comprador bankers and managerial developmentalism in Poland**

*Review of International Political Economy*

APPENDIX A.1.

Description of Appendices A.2-A.10

Given the paper’s relatively controversial claim that comprador bankers have been the driving force behind the revival of developmentalism in Poland since the global financial crisis of 2008, I complement its main body with an extensive set of online appendices. The aim of those appendices is to give: a) more detailed background information on the Polish economy *(Appendix A.2)*; b) a more precise measurement of key outcomes to be explained in the paper *(Appendix A.3)*; c) a description of the paper’s methodological (data analysis and data collection) approach based on process tracing *(Appendices A.4 and A.5)*; and d) the reader access to a relatively large sample of the documents and interview excerpts that constitute my process tracing evidence and to be transparent about how I use them to draw inferences on the relative strength of alternative explanations of the outcome I seek to explain *(Appendices A.6-A.9)*.

**Appendix A.2** presents a number of economic indicators that help understand the socio-economic **structure and context of the Polish “dependent market economy”** and its similarities and differences with other Visegrád-4 (V-4) countries (Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia) and other EU (or ex-EU) countries of similar size (France, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain and the United Kingdom). Data on the **sectoral composition of those economies** show that, like other V-4 countries and Romania, Poland has a much higher share of its value added generated by industry – and lower share of services – than most West European countries (except for Germany) although, in comparison with other Visegrád countries, Poland’s economy is somewhat more dependent on commodities such as mining products (coal and copper), energy commodities (electricity, gas and oil) and agricultural products. Data on **foreign control of enterprises** show that, among the V-4 countries and Romania, Poland has been the least “dependent” on foreign capital (particularly in commodities such as mining and electricity and gas supply) even though that dependence has increased between 2008 and 2016 and differences with West European countries are very striking. Foreign-owned firms generate almost half of employment and revenues in so-called “large” firms (firms with more than 250 employees according the definition used by Poland’s official statistical office). Data on Poland’s 100 firms (excluding financial services providers) confirm that, apart from **large state-owned** utility **firms** (which play a relatively more important role in the Polish economy than in other V-4 and large EU countries), the largest – and technologically most advanced firms – are typically foreign-owned while domestically owned private firms are relatively rare in that list.

**Appendix A.3** focuses on the three specific **outcomes** (“dependent variables”) the paper seeks to explain. A first section provides data on the **repolonization of the banking sector**. The Polish Financial Supervision Authority’s data on domestic vs. foreign over Polish banking asset show a clear trend toward “repolonization” since 2008 – away from a peak of 72% of banking assets controlled by foreign capital in 2008 towards a peak of 55% of these assets controlled by domestic investors in 2017. In comparison with Hungarian efforts to “remagyarize” banking, Poland stands out for having kept – indirect – state control of repolonized banks whereas remagyarized banks are typically sold back to Hungarian private (crony capitalist) investors. A second section focuses on the **reform of Polish development institutions**. It first provides a synoptic view of the institutions that were integrated into the Polish Development Fund (PFR) Group in 2016 and shows that the heavy representation of business in the governance of the PFR’s immediate predecessor – PIR – was very unusual in a European context. Data on the assets of V-4 national development banks as a percentage of GDP show that the Poland’s BGK has been the only development bank in the V-4 group that has bucked a trend towards a decrease in the importance of these banks since the 2010s and that has, in fact, seen its assets increase steadily. The last section of appendix A.3 provides a short description of the “flagship” **industrial policy** projects that were defined in the 2017 Strategy for Responsible Development.

**Appendix A.4** explains the paper’s use of the **method of process tracing**. It briefly explains the Bayesian epistemology that underpins this method and so-called “process-tracing tests” that have been developed in order to assess the strength of evidence on different hypotheses. In that appendix, I report my own “priors” (initial beliefs before evidence was collected) on the plausibility of each hypothesis considered in the paper and in the appendices. I then present **two “hoop tests” (the “guilty mind” and “guilty act” tests** inspired by criminal law theory in common law countries) that I have developed in order to eliminate implausible “suspects” in the co-option or coercion of other actors into (or, together with other actors, in experiencing a co-occurrence of engagement in political activities in favor of) a revival of developmentalism. Finally, I explain my approach to identifying a potential driving force that co-opts or coerces other actors into action.

**Appendix A.5** describes my iterative **approach to collective evidence** and my attempt to follow “best practices” in conducting data collection for process tracing (Bennett & Checkel, 2015). It provides a **list of the interviews** I have conducted. It also includes **biographical data** on some of the bankers and managers involved in the processes I describe.

**Appendices A.6 to A.9** provide access to some of the **source material** (e.g. excerpts of newspaper articles, of policy documents, of minutes of the meetings of parliamentary committees, of speeches made at conferences, and a few interview transcripts[[1]](#footnote-1)) from which I draw inferences about possible causes of the outcomes I study. Appendices A.6-A.8 also include tables where I summarize my inferences based on the “guilty mind” and “guilty act” hoop tests as well as on my approach to identifying a potential driving force (“mastermind”), which I have outlined in appendix A.4. I have prepared these appendices for two reasons. Firstly, I have tried to comply – and, given ongoing debates about best practices, to experiment a bit – with the new norms of transparency, data access (Elman & Kapiszewski, 2014; Jacobs et al., 2021; Kapiszewski & Karcher, 2021) and active citation (Moravcsik, 2014). Secondly, I have felt compelled to prepare such appendices given that my own “prior” on the hypotheses I put forward in the paper was low and that I do not expect readers to have high priors on it either; Given those low priors (and high priors for the rival hypothesis of top-down co-option by state actors or conservative-nationalist parties), I have tried to be as transparent as possible about the “causal process observations” that led me to reach the conclusions I reached in the paper

**Appendix A.6** focuses on the “repolonization” of foreign-owned Polish banks.

**Appendix A.7** focuses on the creation of “Polish Investments for Development” (PIR) in 2013.

**Appendix A.8** focuses on the creation of the Polish Development Fund (PFR) Group in 2016.

**Appendix A.9** focuses on parts of the mechanism explaining compradors’ bankers mobilization in favor of a revival of developmentalism in Poland.

**References:**

Bennett, A., & Checkel, J. T. (2015). Process tracing: From philosophical roots to best practices. In A. Bennett & J.T. Checkel (Eds.) *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool* (pp. 3-37). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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1. Requests were made to more interviewees to give permission to include interview transcripts in the appendices, but some of them refused. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)